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The Montana Supreme Court has traditionally admitted ex-
pert opinion liberally. Although Article VII of the Montana Rules
of Evidence' was designed to clarify admissibility standards and
facilitate the presentation of opinion and expert testimony,2 con-
troversy over admissibility still frequently figures in appeals to the
court. One major area of controversy has been expert testimony by
police officers-typically highway patrol officers, and typically in
the context of highway accident reconstruction. This comment will
examine the status of the highway patrol officer as expert witness
in accident reconstruction in Montana,s focusing on problems that
arise under the rules of evidence governing expert testimony.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The history of the common law rule against opinion testimony
in Montana is as noteworthy for its exceptions as for its restric-
tions. While there was a general rule that witnesses must state
facts rather than opinions, the supreme court has long recognized
that expert testimony is needed to assure correct judgments in
cases involving complicated fact situations.4 Unlike many other ju-
risdictions,5 Montana has also long held that experts are excepted
1. MONT. R. EVID. 701-05. For a comprehensive discussion of the Montana Rules of
Evidence, see Clarke, Montana Rules of Evidence: A General Survey, 39 MoNT. L. REV. 79
(1978).
2. "The intent of Art. VII, M.R.Evid., Opinions and Expert Testimony, is to make
persons possessed of specialized knowledge helpful in assisting the trier of fact to under-
stand the evidence." Wollaston v. Burlington Northern, Inc., - Mont. -, 612 P.2d
1277, 1282 (1980).
3. While police officers have occasionally testified as experts in other contexts, virtu-
ally all Montana cases dealing with expert police testimony involve highway patrol officers
and accident reconstruction. Rules governing expert testimony in this area apply equally to
criminal and civil cases.
4. Demarais v. Johnson, 90 Mont. 366, 370, 3 P.2d 283, 285 (1931).
5. See Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 13 (1954).
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from the rule that witnesses may not give their conclusions as to
ultimate facts in issue.
In the 1952 case of State v. Bosch, the Montana Supreme
Court recognized for the first time that a non-eyewitness may be
qualified to give opinion testimony about a highway accident: "A
highway patrolman with many years of experience in handling an
automobile, investigating wrecks and accidents, with the benefit of
schooling and study courses dealing with skid marks and related
matters is as much an expert in his line as any other specialized
person in his respective field."' The officer, who examined skid
marks left by a car that ran off a road, was permitted to give an
opinion that the car was traveling at least seventy-two miles an
hour. Since Bosch, Montana highway patrol officers have been per-
mitted to give expert opinions about experiments recreating acci-
dents,9 point of impact,10 identity of driver," cause of accident, 2
and adequacy of highway signs.1
III. AREAS OF CONTROVERSY
A. Qualifications
One of the two Rule 702 prerequisites for admissibility of ex-
pert testimony is that the witness be "qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education."" Because
Rule 702 by its own terms offers a variety of ways for a witness to
qualify as an expert, controversy in this area tends to focus on spe-
cific applications where an expert's "expertise" may be suspect. In
other words, even though the highway patrol officer is recognized
as an expert in the field of accident reconstruction, questions may
arise about his qualifications to offer an opinion about a particular
technical aspect of a given accident.
In the 1982 case of Goodnough v. State,1 5 the plaintiff alleged
negligence in maintaining dangerous highway conditions. The state
offered evidence to show that the driver who crashed into the
6. Wibaux Realty Co. v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 101 Mont. 126, 54 P.2d 1175 (1935);
Kelly v. John R. Daily Co., 56 Mont. 63, 181 P. 326 (1919).
7. 125 Mont. 566, 242 P.2d 477 (1952). The court also admitted testimony by an auto-
mobile mechanic who had inspected the skid marks.
8. Id. at 571-72, 242 P.2d at 480.
9. Hurley v. Star Transfer Co., 141 Mont. 176, 376 P.2d 504 (1962).
10. State v. Stoddard, 147 Mont. 402, 412 P.2d 827 (1966).
11. State v. Deshner, 158 Mont. 188, 489 P.2d 1290 (1971).
12. Pachek v. Norton Concrete Co., 160 Mont. 16, 499 P.2d 766 (1972).
13. Workman v. McIntyre Constr. Co., - Mont. -, 617 P.2d 1281 (1980).
14. MoNT. R. EvID. 702.
15. - Mont. -, 647 P.2d 364 (1982).
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plaintiff from behind was the superseding cause of the accident.
One issue raised on appeal was the competence of a highway patrol
officer to testify about the speed of the following vehicle. The
plaintiff claimed that while an officer is generally competent to
give an opinion as to speed based on skid marks, "estimating speed
in a complicated collision requires training in physics and mechan-
ics which highway patrolmen do not have."16
The Montana Supreme Court affirmed admission of the of-
ficer's testimony. From Goodnough, the Montana rule appears to
be that experience in investigating accidents and general training
in "how to estimate speed from the length of skid marks and dam-
age to automobiles' 1 7 qualify a highway patrol officer to give opin-
ion testimony based on observed damage to automobiles. No spe-
cial showing of training in physics or mechanics is required. The
supreme court relied on the general rules that determination of an
expert witness' qualifications lies within the trial judge's discretion
and that so long as the cross-examiner has a chance to probe the
basis of an expert's opinion, the question is one of weight not
admissibility.' 8
Sometimes a generous policy of admissibility can lead to dubi-
ous results. In Mets v. Granrud,9 a 1980 case, the trial court per-
mitted a highway patrol officer to testify that the cause of a one-
vehicle accident was a broken "pitman arm" (a steering mecha-
nism part).2 0 The appellants contended that the officer was un-
qualified to give his opinion about a mechanical malfunction.
Without responding to the gist of the appellants' contention, the
supreme court upheld the lower court's discretion. In a vigorous
dissent, Justice Shea argued that the officer was not qualified to
give that opinion and that the trial court should not have relied on
it in granting summary judgment to the defendant.2 Justice Shea
16. Id. at - , 647 P.2d at 368. Knowledge of physics and mechanics is necessary
because when cars collide at a relatively great speed various factors such as momentum,
inertia, angle of impact, slope of road, design and weight of vehicles, and friction influence
the resulting damage. While speed may be roughly inferred from the amount and kind of
vehicle damage, these other factors need to be taken into account for a more accurate esti-
mate of speed. Skid marks alone cannot provide a basis for estimating speed in a compli-
cated collision because the collision absorbs much of the momentum of the vehicle. Skid
marks are more reliable when they truly indicate stopping distance, such as when a vehicle
comes to an abrupt stop without meeting any resistance or meeting relatively little
resistance.
17. Id. at -, 647 P.2d at 369.
18. Id.
19. - Mont. -, 606 P.2d 1384 (1980).
20. The testimony was contained in the officer's deposition, which the trial court con-
sidered in granting summary judgment to the defendant.
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pointed out that the witness, while generally competent to investi-
gate accidents, had no expertise in metallurgy or mechanics that
would qualify him to testify that a broken pitman arm caused this
particular accident.
One problem in attempting to define the requisite qualifica-
tions for expert testimony in accident reconstruction is that the
published opinions rarely discuss such qualifications in detail. Only
one jury verdict has been overturned by the Montana Supreme
Court because a highway patrol officer's testimony was improperly
admitted,22 and the reason in that case appeared to be lack of evi-
dence rather than lack of qualifications. Although the rules were
not meant to view experts in a narrow sense,2 s in the questionable
case it is important to consider Justice Shea's concern in his Mets
dissent: "Discretion of a trial court in permitting expert testimony
is no substitute for careful consideration of the underlying qualifi-
cations of a witness to advance his opinion on a subject requiring
expert opinion. "24
B. Proper Situations for Expert Testimony
Rule 702 permits expert testimony by qualified experts "[i]f
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue."25 State v. Deshner,2 6 a 1971 case, provides the most com-
plete statement on this aspect of admissibility. Both occupants of a
car were thrown out when the car drove off a road. Based on mea-
surements made at the scene of the accident, an officer gave an
opinion that the defendant was the driver. In upholding admission
of the opinion, the court said:
The basic rule on the admissibility of expert opinion is whether
the subject is one of such common knowledge that men of ordi-
nary education could reach a conclusion as intelligently as the
witness, or whether the matter is sufficiently beyond common ex-
issue on appeal was whether the res ipsa loquitur doctrine applied to the facts of the case.
Plaintiff's expert, a metallurgist, testified that the pitman arm broke when the car collided
with a pole, and not before impact. In Tompkins v. Northwestern Union Trust Co., -
Mont. , 645 P.2d 402 (1982), the court overruled Mets to the extent that it permitted
disposition as a matter of law where conflicting evidence existed.
22. O'Brien v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 145 Mont. 13, 400 P.2d 634 (1965). In Work-
man v. McIntyre Constr. Co., - Mont. -, 617 P.2d 1281 (1980), a verdict was over-
turned on the basis that a highway patrol officer's expert testimony about adequacy of high-
way signs was improperly excluded.
23. FED. R. EviD. 702 advisory committee note.
24. Mets, - Mont. -, 606 P.2d at 1389 (Shea, J., dissenting).
25. MONT. R. EVID. 702.
26. 158 Mont. 188, 489 P.2d 1290 (1971).
254 [Vol. 44
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perience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of
fact."'
This standard of admissibility for expert opinion is easily met
in most accident reconstruction cases because of the complex evi-
dence and the inferences to be derived from it. In other instances,
however, it is difficult to understand why the subject of the ex-
pert's testimony is considered beyond the common experience of
the jury. In Pachek v. Norton Concrete Co.,2 8 a 1972 case, the
court for the first time upheld admission of an investigating high-
way patrol officer's opinion as to the cause of an accident. The ac-
cident occurred when defendant's truck, turning onto a highway
from a gravel road without stopping, collided with the plaintiff's
car, which was traveling along the highway at a reasonable speed.
The officer, who arrived at the scene one-half hour after the acci-
dent, testified on the basis of his observations and statements
made by the parties and other eyewitnesses that a right-of-way vi-
olation caused the accident.
What makes admission of this opinion difficult to justify is
that both parties testified at the trial. The defendant driver, in
fact, testified that he was looking into his mirror rather than down
the highway when he pulled out and that he did not stop. The
officer's testimony, based largely on witness interviews, did not add
to the parties' testimony, and the jury did not need expert testi-
mony to determine the cause of the accident.
Rude v. Neal,2' a 1974 case, similarly involved a highway pa-
trol officer's opinion as to the cause of an accident well within non-
expert comprehension. The collision occurred when the defendant
turned left and struck the plaintiff, who was approaching on the
two-lane highway from the opposite direction. The investigating
officer testified that speed was not a factor in the accident and,
further, that in his opinion the defendant's failure to yield right-
of-way was the cause. The jury could easily have reached the latter
conclusion on its own. While determination of speed is clearly a
proper subject for expert opinion testimony, can the same be said
for determination of cause when neither party was speeding and
the parties were available to testify?
The answer seems to be that the admissibility standard means
what it says. A jury may be capable of understanding and recogniz-
ing right-of-way violations without the help of specialized knowl-
27. Id. at 193, 489 P.2d at 1293 (quoting State v. Campbell, 146 Mont. 251, 258, 405
P.2d 978, 983 (1965)).
28. 160 Mont. 16, 499 P.2d 766 (1972).
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edge. Yet it is difficult to contend that an officer, who has investi-
gated hundreds of accidents and who inspected the scene of the
accident in question, has nothing to add to assist the jury on the
causation issue. Moreover, Rule 702 encourages the use of special-
ized understanding to insure that the trier of fact arrives at the
correct conclusion." The fact that the jury is free to disregard the
expert's opinions' serves to mitigate the possibility of prejudice.
This survey of the law, however, must be considered in light of
the holding in Ployhar v. Board of Trustees,"2 a 1980 case. The
plaintiffs sought damages for the death of their son, who was killed
when a tractor ran over him during a class in heavy equipment
operation. A supervising instructor, when asked during cross-exam-
ination for his opinion as to the cause of the accident, testified that
the decedent was at fault. After a verdict for the defendant, the
trial court granted a new trial on the basis that expert opinion tes-
timony had been improperly admitted.
The Montana Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion by
the trial judge in excluding the expert opinion testimony. The
court reasoned that the accident was simple enough to be within
the understanding of the jury. In reaching its conclusion, however,
the court described the expert testimony as "not necessary."3 3 Ask-
ing whether testimony is "necessary" is quite different from asking
whether testimony "will assist the trier of fact." Further, as Justice
Harrison rightly recognized in his dissent, the case does involve
technical questions of a complexity comparable to those in other
Montana cases where expert opinion was admitted.3 4
It is tempting to view Ployhar as an aberration. First, the case
has not been cited in more recent cases. Second, the appeal in-
volved the granting of a new trial rather than a verdict. Third, the
holding on admissibility is out of line with the court's other deci-
sions. The fact remains, though, that the court has indicated its
willingness to exclude expert opinions on the cause of an accident
on the basis that the jury should be able to reach an independent
30. There is no more certain test for determining when experts may be used than
the common sense inquiry whether the untrained layman would be qualified to
determine intelligently and to the best possible degree the particular issue without
enlightenment from those having a specialized understanding of the subject in-
volved in the dispute.
Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 418 (1952), quoted in FaD. R. EvD. 702
advisory committee note.
31. Rose v. Rose, - Mont. -, 651 P.2d 1018, 1020 (1982); McGuire v. Nelson,
167 Mont. 188, 200, 536 P.2d 768, 775 (1975).
32. - Mont. - 609 P.2d 1226 (1980).
33. Id. at -, 609 P.2d at 1228.
34. Id. at -, 609 P.2d at 1228-30 (Harrison, J., dissenting).
256 [Vol. 44
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C. Bases of Opinion and Disclosure of Underlying Facts
Rules 703 and 705 are designed to facilitate admission of ex-
pert opinion testimony by widening the bases for such testimony
and removing from the party offering it the burden of disclosing all
the data upon which it is based. Under Rule 703, an expert may
base his opinion on one or more of three sources: personal percep-
tion, facts disclosed to him at trial, and facts "of a type reasonably
relied upon by experts in a particular field," whether or not inde-
pendently admissible in evidence. 5 Under Rule 705, an expert
need not disclose facts underlying an opinion unless so ordered by
the court, although he may be required to disclose underlying facts
on cross-examination. 6 While these rules save time and increase
the use of expert assistance, one problem that arises in this area is
reliability of expert opinion testimony.
Rule 703 clearly permits an expert to base his opinion on hear-
say evidence in some circumstances. A doctor, for example, may
give an opinion based on hospital records, X rays, and nurses' re-
ports 3 7-hearsay sources that are probably independently admissi-
ble-and may also base an opinion on inadmissible hearsay such as
a police report.3 8 The rationale for this rule is that the "expert is
fully capable of judging for himself what is or is not a reliable basis
for his opinion.""
This reasoning is generally sound, but when a highway patrol
officer is the expert the possibility of unreliable testimony appears
greater for two reasons. First, the Montana cases have not indi-
cated the extent to which the officer's opinion may lawfully be
based on interviews with possibly biased parties and eyewitnesses.
Second, because under Rule 705 facts or data underlying the ex-
pert opinion will not necessarily be disclosed, the court and jury
may not have a chance to consider unreliable bases of testimony.
Montana cases have not distinguished between physical evi-
dence and interviews with eyewitnesses as sources of information. 0
35. MoNr. R. EvD. 703.
36. MONT. R. EVID. 705.
37. See FED. R. EvID. 703 advisory committee note.
38. See Azure v. City of Billings, - Mont. -, 596 P.2d 460 (1979).
39. United States v. Sims, 514 F.2d 147, 149 (9th Cir. 1975), quoted in Azure,
Mont. -, 596 P.2d at 472.
40. The commission comments to Rule 703 seem to regard this tendency as implicit
authority for admitting testimony based on hearsay: "it is apparent that highway patrolmen
are allowed to reconstruct and give the cause of an accident based upon their investigation
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While no Montana case has admitted expert accident reconstruc-
tion testimony based solely on witness interviews, such interviews
may have strongly influenced the testimony that has been admit-
ted. The extent to which this kind of influence should be permitted
is difficult to measure. Witnesses can obviously be of great help to
an officer investigating an accident scene. Because the patrol of-
ficer is an expert, it does seem unlikely that he will give an opinion
based on at-the-scene statements uncorroborated by physical evi-
dence. Whether the expert's appraisal successfully weeds out self-
serving statements, however, is a question that might not be an-
swered by the litigation process because hearsay sources will not be
fully disclosed in some cases.
If a rule can be inferred from the case law, it is that witness
statements are a valid source of information where there is also
substantial physical evidence. This "rule" avoids the danger of un-
substantiated hearsay recognized in the Advisory Committee's
Note to federal rule 703, which explicitly warned against accident
reconstruction based on eyewitness testimony.4'
Rule 705 appears on its face likely to make opinion testimony
less reliable because it allows a witness to testify without disclosing
underlying facts. This procedure was designed to serve the rule's
primary purpose: elimination of time-consuming hypothetical
questions.42 The rule provides compensating assurances of reliabil-
ity since the court and the cross-examiner can compel disclosure of
the underlying facts.43 If such a disclosure is made and the evi-
dence is insufficient to support the conclusions, then the court
ought to be able to reject the testimony as a matter of law.44
Whether a Montana court will do so, however, is doubtful
under the interpretation of Rule 705 in Wollaston v. Burlington
comments.
41. If it be feared that enlargement of permissible data may tend to break down
the rules of exclusion unduly, notice should be taken that the rule requires that
the facts or data" be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular
field." The language would not warrant admitting in evidence the opinion of an
"accidentologist" as to the point of impact in an automobile collision based on
statements of bystanders, since this requirement is not satisfied.
FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee note.
42. MoNT. R. EVID. 705 commission comments. Prior to the rule's adoption, hypotheti-
cal questions were not an indispensable prerequisite to expert opinion testimony in Mon-
tana, although witnesses were required to testify as to facts upon which their opinions were
based. State v. Hallam, 175 Mont. 492, 575 P.2d 55 (1978).
43. Under MoNT. R. Cxv. P. 26(b)(4), a party can discover through interrogatories the
facts on which an expert expected to testify at trial will base his opinion. This procedure
helps the party to prepare to challenge any insufficient bases of testimony.
44. This is essentially what happened in O'Brien v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 145 Mont.
13, 400 P.2d 634 (1965), a pre-rules case. See supra text accompanying note 22.
258 [Vol. 44
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Northern, Inc. ,4 a 1980 case. After settlement with the railroad,
the plaintiff's action for damages from an automobile-train colli-
sion proceeded against Sanders County for negligence in maintain-
ing a grade crossing. The county's case depended mainly on the
investigating highway patrol officer's testimony that the accident
occurred because of the plaintiff's failure to yield right-of-way. On
appeal, the plaintiff contended that the opinion as to cause should
not have been admitted because the officer had lost the notes he
made at the time of his investigation.
In ruling the testimony admissible, the supreme court stated
that under Rule 705 the officer's "opinion was admissible, irrespec-
tive of what underlying facts or data may have buttressed his
opinion. "46 Here, the fact that the notes were lost was harmless
because the jury was made aware of the loss and the expert based
his opinion in part on photographs and documents examined dur-
ing trial. The rule arising from the case, however, indicates that it
is the jury's task-not the court's-to determine whether there is
sufficient evidence to support an opinion: "As long as the cross-
examiner is given adequate opportunity to bring forth for the
jury's consideration the weaknesses of any assumptions or facts
underlying the opinion, the weight to be given the expert's testi-
mony even on the ultimate issue, is now for the jury to
determine. '4 7
Thus while the qualification of an expert lies within the trial
court's discretion, the sufficiency of the basis for his opinion is a
matter of weight for the jury to decide. 48 Logically, since the trial
court generally has wide discretion in admitting or excluding evi-
dence, one would assume that the court retains some legal discre-
tion to exclude for insufficient basis. Under Wollaston, however,
the court does not appear to have this power.
D. Cause of Accident
Rule 704 states that otherwise admissible opinion testimony
"is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be
45. __ Mont. -, 612 P.2d 1277 (1980).
46. Id. at -, 612 P.2d at 1282 (emphasis added).
47. Id.
48. Carried to its extreme conclusion, this position could lead to dubious results, since
a qualified expert could conceivably give an opinion without any reliable factual basis what-
soever. This is what may have happened in Mets, according to the dissent in that case. Mets
is even more questionable in that the case was disposed of on a summary judgment motion,
so that the suspect testimony was not subject to full cross-examination. See supra notes 19-
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decided by the trier of fact."4 Montana has long permitted expert
witnesses to give opinions as to the cause of an accident. Still, ob-
jections are often made to opinions on cause. As long as the expert
is found properly qualified and the subject a proper one for expert
testimony, the objections are consistently rejected.
It may be helpful to consider the experience of this rule in
another state, not so much to recommend the result as to explore
the problems the rule obscures. In 1978, despite case law and a
statutory directive to the contrary, 50 the Kansas Supreme Court
held in Lollis v. Superior Sales Co. 51 that an expert witness in an
automobile negligence case, "whether an investigating police officer
or another expert, may not state his opinion as to what actions of
the parties, if any, contributed to the collision or as to who was at
fault in causing the collision.""2
The result was determined by the court's recognition of a dan-
ger that opinions on cause or contributing factors by their very na-
ture weigh disputed evidence and invade the province of the jury.
The investigating officer in Lollis testified at trial that the plain-
tiff's excessive speed had contributed to his accident. The plaintiff,
however, had been knocked unconscious by the accident and was
unable to give his version of the facts to the officer, who depended
on the defendant's self-serving statements. If the officer had heard
the plaintiff's equally plausible story, he could easily have arrived
at a completely different opinion as to which driver's negligence
contributed to the collision. In Montana, the conflicting testimony
would be considered a question of weight for the jury to resolve.
The Kansas court, emphasizing that further evidence may turn up
after an investigation and that a patrol officer's testimony may
overly impress a jury, excluded the testimony altogether.
The foregoing discussion is not intended to suggest that Mon-
tana should adopt such a rule." The Kansas experience is instruc-
tive, though, in showing how admission of opinion testimony under
49. MoNT. R. EVID. 704.
50. The Kansas statute reads in pertinent part: "Testimony in the form of opinions or
inferences otherwise admissible under this article is not objectionable because it embraces
the ultimate issue or issues to be decided by the trier of fact." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-456(d)
(1965).
51. 224 Kan. 251, 580 P.2d 423 (1978). A discussion of the series of Kansas cases cul-
minating in Lollis can be found in Note, Opinion and Demonstrative Evidence: Automobile
Accident Reconstruction, 14 WASHBURN L.J. 264 (1975). Lollis was noted in Evidence: Po-
lice Experts and Ultimate Issue Testimony, 18 WASHBURN L.J. 659 (1979).
52. Lollis, 224 Kan. at 263, 580 P.2d at 431.
53. Kansas appears to be unique among the states in taking the position, after adopt-
ing evidentiary rules permitting opinion testimony on ultimate issues of fact, that experts
may not testify as to causes or contributing factors of a highway accident.
[Vol. 44
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the rules of evidence can result in prejudice to a party. The offend-
ing testimony in Lollis would likely be received in Montana be-
cause it came from a qualified expert who was assisting the trier of
fact (Rule 702) and was based on physical evidence and a witness
interview (Rule 703); nor would it be excluded because it embraced
an ultimate issue (Rule 704) or lacked a proper foundation (Rule
705). Montana's long tradition of admitting opinions on cause and
other ultimate issues would prevent the final result in Lollis, which
excepted accident reconstruction from the general rule that experts
can offer opinions that embrace ultimate issues.
Kansas adopted its position as a form of insurance against re-
ceiving unreliable testimony otherwise admissible under its eviden-
tiary rules. While that response is extreme, it is important to note
how reliance on discretion of the trial court and the jury's ability
to weigh evidence can lead to admission of an unreliable and actu-
ally misleading "expert opinion" about the cause of an accident.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Montana Rules of Evidence, while designed to enhance
trial integrity by eliminating time-consuming procedures and en-
couraging expert assistance, can produce unreliable results in their
application. Expert testimony by highway patrol officers is gener-
ally of great benefit to juries in litigation involving accident recon-
struction. The possibility that juries will be unduly influenced by
testimony of questionable reliability, however, is unnecessarily
strong. The Montana Supreme Court can mitigate this problem by
establishing more uniform and explicit standards governing such
questions as expert qualifications, proper subjects for expert testi-
mony, and evidentiary foundations. This will help to insure that
the highway patrol officer is most useful where he is best qualified:
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